We examine the closure conditions of the probabilistic consequence relation of Hawthorne and Makinson, specifically the outstanding question of completeness in terms of Horn rules, of their proposed (finite) set of rules O. We show that on the contrary no such finite set of Horn rules exists, though we are able to specify an infinite set which is complete.

One usually identifies a particular collection of geometric objects with the models of general relativity. But within this standard collection lurk ‘physically unreasonable’ models of spacetime. If such models are ruled out, attention can be restricted to some sub-collection of ‘physically reasonable’ models which can be considered a variant theory of general relativity. Since we have yet to identify a privileged sub-collection of ‘physically reasonable’ models, it is helpful to think of ‘general relativity’ in a pluralistic way; we can study (...) a collection of such ‘physically reasonable’ collections of models. (shrink)

I analyze a number of the quantum no-signalling proofs (Ghirardi et al. 1980, Bussey 1982, Jordan 1983, Shimony 1985, Redhead 1987, Eberhard and Ross 1989, Sherer and Busch 1993). These purport to show that the EPR correlations cannot be exploited for transmitting signals, i.e., are not causal. First, I show that these proofs can be mathematically unified; they are disguised versions of a single theorem. Second, I argue that these proofs are circular. The essential theorem relies upon the tensor product (...) representation for combined systems, which has no physical basis in the von Neumann axioms. Historically, the construction of this representation scheme by von Neumann and Weyl built no-signalling assumptions into the quantum theory. Signalling between the wings of the EPR-Bell experiments is unlikely but is not ruled out empirically by the class of proofs considered. (shrink)

We examine the closure conditions of the probabilistic consequence relation of Hawthorne and Makinson, specifically the outstanding question of completeness in terms of Horn rules, of their proposed (finite) set of rules O. We show that on the contrary no such finite set of Horn rules exists, though we are able to specify an infinite set which is complete.

Although the existence of tachyons is not ruled out by special relativity, it appears that causal paradoxes will arise if there are tachyons. The usual solutions to these paradoxes employ some form of the reinterpretation principle. In this paper it is argued first that the principle is incoherent, second that even if it is not, some causal paradoxes remain, and third, the most plausible “solution,” which appeals to boundary conditions of the universe, will conflict with special relativity.

The first three volumes of the Minnesota Studies have become recent classics. They contain some of the most important and philosophically suggestive papers published during the fifties and early sixties. Some of the discussions which are the basis of volume IV took place in 1966 and a number of the papers here seem "dated"--at least to the extent that discussion of the relevant issues has been superseded by publication in other places. There is still another tour de force by Paul (...) K. Feyerabend, who is becoming more strident and more anarchistic in his politics, epistemology, and philosophy of science. There is a brief paper by the late N. R. Hanson and a typically solid and balanced defense of the "standard conception" of scientific theories by Carl G. Hempel. Three papers by Paul E. Meehl are included which, as usual, excel in the care and clarity of argument--even though there seems to be little that is new here. And there is also an informed discussion of correspondence rules by a number of participants in a special conference dedicated to this subject. While the quality of the papers is high, this volume nevertheless lacks some of the excitement and novelty of the earlier volumes.--R. J. B. (shrink)

Wood informs the reader that Buber rejected "isms," hard and fast rules and principles, and systems, but he goes on to systematize Buber's thought nonetheless. The result is often enlightening. I and Thou, which Wood considers the central work of the philosopher's thought, is finely broken down and analyzed in its component parts. In this manner it is less formidable to the uninitiated, and the reader who is puzzled by a particular passage can find in Wood's book an authoritative, well-researched (...) explanation. There are also excellent biographical data woven in with glimpses of Buber's voluminous works and the influences on them, and a complete bibliography that is as definitive as any published to date. But Buber's thought does not lend itself to systematization. One cannot substitute Ontology for Metaphysics and then proceed to dissect a philosophy which declares itself to be beyond metaphysics, and which points to the existential meeting of a person here and now with another person and/or with God. Wood provides a diagram showing the structure of I and Thou which may be useful for locating selections in the book as they relate to a certain code, but at the same time it illustrates what Buber describes as objectification, an I-it relationship with a person or his work, which is far from the I-Thou relationship.--S. J. B. (shrink)

Another textbook of traditional logic, subject to the characteristic limitations of that tradition. Propositional logic receives scant attention, and polyadic predicates are ignored. Propositions are in places confused with terms, as when the transitivity of implication is analyzed in terms of the Barbara syllogism. Although professedly Aristotelian, the treatment departs from Aristotle on a number of points: syllogisms are presented as inference rules rather than as logical theses; singular statements are assimilated to universal ones; and modal syllogisms are not covered. (...) Only about one-third of the book treats formal logic; the remainder includes discussion of basic semiotic, definition and division, induction, and fallacies, along with the rudiments of Thomistic epistemology and metaphysics.--J. B. B. (shrink)

A brilliant attempt to show how the Transcendental Deduction can be construed as a strict logical deduction. Using Kemp Smith's "pathwork" theory in a novel way, Wolff organizes his commentary around four versions of the main argument which reflect Kant's increasing philosophic subtlety. The heart of the commentary is an analysis of synthesis as a rule-directed mental activity. Throughout there is a judicious balance of historical, textual and philosophic analysis, making this a truly rich commentary.--R. J. B.

A brilliant attempt to show how the Transcendental Deduction can be construed as a strict logical deduction. Using Kemp Smith's "pathwork" theory in a novel way, Wolff organizes his commentary around four versions of the main argument which reflect Kant's increasing philosophic subtlety. The heart of the commentary is an analysis of synthesis as a rule-directed mental activity. Throughout there is a judicious balance of historical, textual and philosophic analysis, making this a truly rich commentary.--R. J. B.

Kemp's purpose is to investigate the function of reason in man's practical life. He proceeds by critically discussing the view of Cudworth, Locke, Clarke, Hume, and Kant on the relation between reason and morality. This serves as a basis for Kemp's own discussion in which, as is characteristic of many contemporary philosophers, he attempts to distinguish carefully between describing a line of conduct and assessing it. He delineates four methods of assessment: conformity of an action to law, consistency of a (...) line of conduct, intelligence of behavior, and insight or discernment of the requirements of a situation. While the approach of Kemp is in the spirit of many other recent investigations of moral discourse and rules, it is not entirely clear in what ways he makes an advance beyond these investigations.—R. J. B. (shrink)

This collection of gracefully written essays can serve as an excellent introduction to the major trends in recent analytic ethics. Though most of Aiken's positive theses have been developed in detail by others, he blends them into a unique total outlook. Throughout, he is concerned to show the practical significance of the analytic temper in moral philosophy and gives eloquent expression to the tension between individual choice and commitment to the rule-regulated behavior of the community.--R.J.B.

A clear, compact, technical presentation of the traditional topics of symbolic logic. The propositional calculus, which Lorenzen develops for ten truth functions, is formulated in six axioms to enable comparison with intuitionism. An important part of the book is Lorenzen's "establishment" of the axioms of Brouwer's intuitionistic calculus by proving their universal admissibility for any calculus. If the and's and if's of these axioms are interpreted as metalinguistic terms used in stating inference rules for object calculi, then no matter what (...) calculus the axioms are added to, no new theorems become provable. In the process of this "establishment" of what he calls "effective logic," Lorenzen makes use of nine different kinds of implication.-J. B. B. (shrink)

Another textbook of traditional logic, subject to the characteristic limitations of that tradition. Propositional logic receives scant attention, and polyadic predicates are ignored. Propositions are in places confused with terms, as when the transitivity of implication is analyzed in terms of the Barbara syllogism. Although professedly Aristotelian, the treatment departs from Aristotle on a number of points: syllogisms are presented as inference rules rather than as logical theses; singular statements are assimilated to universal ones; and modal syllogisms are not covered. (...) Only about one-third of the book treats formal logic; the remainder includes discussion of basic semiotic, definition and division, induction, and fallacies, along with the rudiments of Thomistic epistemology and metaphysics.--J. B. B. (shrink)

This essay in transcendental philosophy argues for theism on the basis that God is the guarantor of meaning. In the pursuit of the logical and metaphysical foundations of theoretical thought, where thought is taken as that which stands "in intentional relation to the act or function of thinking," Young begins by dwelling overly long on the linguistic origin of "theory" in the Greek theoria as used by the Pythagoreans, Plato, and Aristotle. He then proceeds through a discussion of the family (...) resemblances among scientific and philosophical usages of "theory" to the understanding of the content of theoretical thought as meaning formed in concepts and propositions. The marks of the contents of theoretical thought are abstractness, universality, and a priority. Utilizing a distinction between cogency and validity and distinguishing among presuppositions, rules, and premisses. Young attempts to justify the belief in the existence of God on the basis of the ontological argument which he gives in various formulations. The resurrection of the ontological argument in the context of modal logic and language philosophy is an interesting exercise.--J. B. L. (shrink)

This work should be quite useful as a problem guide to phenomenalist and dualist metaphysics. Professor Yolton is concerned that any system be read both from an internal and an external perspective keeping them as separate and distinct as possible. He also cautions that the external perspective should not presuppose another metaphysic for that has often resulted in gross misreadings of earlier authors. In the first section of the book, phenomenalism, he shows how, for example, D. M. Armstrong and G. (...) Warnock have misread Berkeley and attacks G. Warnock and J. Austin's principle which rules out use of a technical irreducible language by philosophers. Solipsism and idealism as well as Berkeley's sensory phenomenalism are treated. In the second section of the book, dualism, Professor Yolton argues that some "transcendent Meaning Principle" is necessary to make the non-sensual side of dualism intelligible, outlines Plato's dualism as against Protagorian monism, indicates what he considers B. Russell's dualism and tries to show that Russell's treatment of one side is partially completed by C. I. Lewis' treatment of what Professor Yolton considers the other side. In the third section on meaning and truth he tries to establish 1) that there is a large measure of intranslatability between philosophical systems; 2) that meaning involves referrent necessarily; 3) that truth is defined by ontological rules; and 4) that correspondence is the basic truth-relation. Brief discussion is given of certain aspects of the works of P. Strawson, B. Russell, J. S. Mill, G. Ryle, W. V. O. Quine, Meinong, and Eric Tom. Slightly over half of this book is comprised of papers, some slightly modified, published from 1949 to 1961.--J. B. L. (shrink)

Fourteen essays are here collected from a number of periodicals. Six deal with the relations between language and the world, two with rules, one with possibility, two with causation, one with time, and two with the "problem of induction." In an appendix, Prof. Black notes various objections that have been made to his views. Though some of the essays are rather slight, a number of valuable points are made, and the volume on the whole is quite useful. --J. B. S.

Beginning with the traditional rules for syllogistic validity, Bird leads the reader without further ado through Aristotle's method of reduction, Keynes' treatment of the antilogism, Lukasiewicz's axiomatization, Ivo Thomas's extension of the last to negative terms, and on to the treatment of empty terms via informal Boolean algebra and the introduction of singular terms. Lukasiewicz's axiom system is investigated in some detail, and independence and consistency are proved. The problem of existential import is discussed quite thoroughly, though it is doubtful (...) that the last word is spoken here. Modalities come in for discussion, but their relation to syllogistic is hardly indicated. Not covered are quantificational analyses of syllogistic. The presentation is marred though not vitiated by various imprecisions in the metatheory. Symbolism is used from the start, and Venn diagrams are resorted to throughout.—J. B. B. (shrink)

If the slogan "No entity without identity" might be said to encapsulate the new essentialism, it has in any case been felt to serve the working ontologist as a powerful tool for ruling out certain dubious entities. The first half of Baruch Brody’s book consists in a radical "critique of this whole philosophical tradition," as it is seen to be "based upon a fundamental erroneous assumption," namely that "the truth-conditions of claims concerning identity vary as the type of entity in (...) question varies." In fact no such parochial identity conditions need be invoked according to Brody, seeing that the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles will suffice to define identity in omnibus fashion across the board, even to the extent of being "understood by those who want to learn the meaning of ‘identity'.". (shrink)

A number of nonmonotonic reasoning formalisms have been introduced to model the set of beliefs of an agent. These include the extensions of a default logic, the stable models of a general logic program, and the extensions of a truth maintenance system among others. In [13] and [16], the authors introduced nonmonotomic rule systems as a nonlogical generalization of all essential features of such formulisms so that theorems applying to all could be proven once and for all. In this (...) paper, we extend Rieter's normal default theories, which have a number of the nice properties which make them a desirable context for belief revision, to the setting of nonmonotonic rule systems. Reiter defined a default theory to be normal if all the rules of the default theory satisfied a simple syntatic condition. However, this simple syntatic condition has no obvious analogue in the setting of nonmonotonic rule systems. Nevertheless, an analysis of the proofs of the main results on normal default theories reveals that the proofs do not rely on the particular syntactic form of the rules but rather on the fact that all rules have a certain consistency property. This led us to extend the notion of normal default theories with respect to a general consistency property. This extended notion of normal default theories, which we call Forward Chaining normal , is easily lifted to nonmonotomic rule systems and hence applies to general logic programs and truth maintenance. (shrink)

Viewed in the light of the remarkable performance of ‘Watson’ - IBMs proprietary artificial intelligence computer system capable of answering questions posed in natural language - on the US general knowledge quiz show ‘Jeopardy’, we review two experiments on formal systems - one in the domain of quantum physics, the other involving a pictographic languaging game - whereby behaviour seemingly characteristic of domain understanding is generated by the mere mechanical application of simple rules. By re-examining both experiments in the context (...) of Searle’s Chinese Room Argument, we suggest their results merely endorse Searle’s core intuition: that ‘syntactical manipulation of symbols is not sufficient for semantics’. Although, pace Watson, some artificial intelligence practitioners have suggested that more complex, higher-level operations on formal symbols are required to instantiate understanding in computational systems, we show that even high-level calls to Google translate would not enable a computer qua ‘formal symbol processor’ to understand the language it processes. We thus conclude that even the most recent developments in ‘quantum linguistics’ will not enable computational systems to genuinely understand natural language. (shrink)

From a global historical viewpoint, federal systems are the exception rather than the rule, even though examples of federalism can already be found in Greek antiquity. From the 17th century onwards there was a revival of federalism, but in the post-World War II-era of decolonization federal systems did not emerge as the most popular form of government.Still, there is considerable variation among federal systems, i.e. those political systems where governmental authority is constitutionally divided among a central «federal» government and (...) «state» governments in such a way, that each type of government has final decision-making authority in at least a few policy fields ; a federation may be either effective or formal, unitary or decentralized, symmetrical or asymmetrical. In order to explain the extent and the kind of federalism in specific cases, the formallegal structure, the socio-economic environment and the political behaviour of elites as well as citizens should be taken into account. Political behaviour should be taken as the key factor, without disregard, however, for its relationship to social factors and format structures. In order to assess their relative importance, comparative research is required; Western Europe and the Third World offer highly promising prospects for this type of research. On the research agenda of federalism, special attention should be given to topics like the informal federal arrangements in cabinet formation, policy-making and public administration, federal party polities, and the impact of public policies on the federal socio-economic environment. (shrink)

In a series of illuminating papers Frankena called attention to a basic philosophical disagreement about what features distinguish moral from non-moral principles, rules, ideals, etc., and about “what a morality is,” when, for example, one speaks of the “morality” of a person or a group. After reviewing a number of writings, he emphasized an important contrast between two “families” of moralists and moral philosophers. On the one side are those who think that certain “formal” conditions are sufficient to distinguish moral (...) “action-guides” from nonmoral ones. On the other side are those who insist that a certain “material” and “social” condition must be added; as they see it, an action-guide is moral only if it pronounces “actions and agents to be right, wrong, good, bad, etc., simply because of the effect they have on the feelings, interests, ideals, etc., of other persons or centers of sentient experience, actual or hypothetical.” The issue, in brief, is whether any set of principles or other articles counts as a morality simply because a person or a group of persons takes that set as the supreme, or as a rational and universalizable guide to what is right and wrong, or whether such a set must be “social” in the sense that acts are prescribed as right or wrong in virtue of the acts’ effects on others as well as on oneself. In the former group, Frankena includes existentialists, many religious thinkers, Hare, Ladd, Falk, etc.; in the latter, Toulmin, Baier, Singer, Strawson, Kemp, etc. (shrink)

We review de Finetti’s two coherence criteria for determinate probabilities: coherence1defined in terms of previsions for a set of events that are undominated by the status quo – previsions immune to a sure-loss – and coherence2 defined in terms of forecasts for events undominated in Brier score by a rival forecast. We propose a criterion of IP-coherence2 based on a generalization of Brier score for IP-forecasts that uses 1-sided, lower and upper, probability forecasts. However, whereas Brier score is a strictly (...) proper scoring rule for eliciting determinate probabilities, we show that there is no real-valuedstrictly proper IP-score. Nonetheless, with respect to either of two decision rules – Γ-maximin or E-admissibility-+-Γ-maximin – we give a lexicographic strictly proper IP-scoring rule that is based on Brier score. (shrink)

We investigate differences between a simple Dominance Principle applied to sums of fair prices for variables and dominance applied to sums of forecasts for variables scored by proper scoring rules. In particular, we consider differences when fair prices and forecasts correspond to finitely additive expectations and dominance is applied with infinitely many prices and/or forecasts.

SummaryLooking at proof theory as an attempt to ‘code’ the general pattern of the logical steps of a mathematical proof, the question of what kind of rules can make the meaning of a logical connective completely explicit does not seem to have been answered satisfactorily. The lambda calculus seems to have been more coherent simply because the use of ‘λ’ together with its projection 'apply' is specified by what can be called a 'reduction' rule: β‐conversion. We attempt to analyse (...) the role of proof rules, making use of a set of formal rules designed to capture both the notions of proof theory and those of the lambda‐calculus: Martin‐Löf's Intuitionistic Type Theory.RésuméSi on considère la théorie de la démonstration comme une tentative de ‘codifier’ les pas logiques d'une démonstration mathématique, on se rendra compte qu'on n'a pas répondu de façon satisfaisante à la question suivante: quelles sont les règies qui rendent complètement explicite le sens d'un connecteur logique? Le lambda‐calcul a été apparemment plus cohérent, tout simplement parce que l'utilisation du‘λ’ avec sa projection 'apply' est spécifiée par une regie de 'réduction': β‐conversion. Nous essayons d'analyser le rôle des règies de démonstration, en utilisant un système formel de règies conçu pour englober à la fois les notions de la théorie de la démonstration et celles du lambda‐calcul: la Théorie Intuitionniste des Types de Martin‐Löf.ZusammenfassungWenn man Beweistheorie als einen Versuch, ein allgemeines Muster der logischen Schritte in einem mathematischen Beweis zu kodifizieren, betrachtet, so scheint die Frage nach der Art von Regeln , die die Bedeutung von logischen Operatoren vollständig beschreiben, nicht zufriedenstellend beantwortet. Der Lambda‐Kalkül erscheint, kohärenter, einfach deshalb weil der Gebrauch von ‘λ’ zusammen mit dessen Projektion 'apply' durch Regeln bestimmt wird, die man 'Reduktions'‐Regeln nennen kann: β‐Konversion. Wir versuchen, die Rolle von Beweisregeln zu analysieren, indem wir ein Regelsystem verwenden, das sowohl die Begriffe der Beweistheorie als auch diejenigen des Lambda‐Kalküls erfasst, nämlich die Martin‐Löfsche Typentheorie. (shrink)

The intention here is that of giving a formal underpinning to the idea of ‘meaning-is-use’ which, even if based on proofs, it is rather different from proof-theoretic semantics as in the Dummett–Prawitz tradition. Instead, it is based on the idea that the meaning of logical constants are given by the explanation of immediate consequences, which in formalistic terms means the effect of elimination rules on the result of introduction rules, i.e. the so-called reduction rules. For that we suggest an extension (...) to the Curry– Howard interpretation which draws on the idea of labelled deduction, and brings back Frege’s device of variable-abstraction to operate on the labels (i.e., proof-terms) alongside formulas of predicate logic. (shrink)

The intention here is that of giving a formal underpinning to the idea of 'meaning-is-use' which, even if based on proofs, it is rather different from proof-theoretic semantics as in the Dummett-Prawitz tradition. Instead, it is based on the idea that the meaning of logical constants are given by the explanation of immediate consequences, which in formalistic terms means the effect of elimination rules on the result of introduction rules, i. e. the so-called reduction rules. For that we suggest an (...) extension to the Curry-Howard interpretation which draws on the idea of labelled deduction, and brings back Frege's device of variable-abstraction to operate on the labels (i. e., proof-terms) alongside formulas of predicate logic. (shrink)

We give necessary and sufficient conditions for a scoring rule to be proper for a quantile if utility is linear, and the distribution is unrestricted. We also give results when the set of distributions is limited, for example, to distributions that have first moments.

Plagiarism and other transgressions of the norms of academic integrity appear to be a persistent problem among upper secondary students. Numerous surveys have revealed high levels of infringement of what appear to be clearly stated rules. Less attention has been given to students’ understanding of academic integrity, and to the potential misconceptions and false beliefs that may make it difficult for them to comply with existing rules and handle complex real-life situations.In this paper we report findings from a survey of (...) European upper secondary students’ views on issues relating to academic integrity. We relate these findings to the students’ training about academic integrity, self-reported level of questionable behavior and country of study.A total of 1654 students at 51 institutions located in 6 European countries participated in the study. The participants generally believed they had a good understanding of the rules applying to them and knew how to behave in compliance with norms of academic integrity. The results indicate, however, that often, in practice, this belief was mistaken. Many students had an inadequate understanding of core elements of academic integrity. They were uncertain about how to act, and they struggled in the handling of complex situations that require context-sensitive judgement. While some differences between countries were identified, they were modest and exhibited no clear pattern. Our results also suggest that reducing students’ level of uncertainty and, to a lesser degree, improving their level of knowledge could lead them to engage less in certain types of questionable behaviours. Surprisingly, the effect of academic training is modest and ambiguous. The study also confirms that perception of peer behaviour has the strongest association with student engagement in questionable behaviours. Thus, academic integrity at the upper secondary level cannot be explained simply in terms of individual ethics or knowledge. (shrink)

Recently various gedankenexperiments have been formulated which argue that the assumption that “elements of reality” are Lorentz invariant cannot be reconciled with standard quantum mechanics. Two of these gedankenexperiments were subsequently analyzed using the notion of pre- and postselected quantum systems, and it was claimed that elements of reality can be made Lorentz invariant if the “product rule” of standard quantum mechanics is abandoned. In this paper we show that the apparent violations of the product rule in these (...) gedankenexperiments are not as significant as they appeared to be in the previous analysis. We conclude that the problems with Lorentz invariance which arise in these gedankenexperiments are essentially unrelated to the product rule violations. (shrink)

This important collection of essays is a synthesis of foundational studies in Bayesian decision theory and statistics. An overarching topic of the collection is understanding how the norms for Bayesian decision making should apply in settings with more than one rational decision maker and then tracing out some of the consequences of this turn for Bayesian statistics. There are four principal themes to the collection: cooperative, non-sequential decisions; the representation and measurement of 'partially ordered' preferences; non-cooperative, sequential decisions; and pooling (...) rules and Bayesian dynamics for sets of probabilities. The volume will be particularly valuable to philosophers concerned with decision theory, probability, and statistics, statisticians, mathematicians, and economists. (shrink)

This lucid and compact book contains a forceful critique of the "wave-particle duality" interpretations of quantum theory, and a unitary particle theory which explains the quantum rules in terms of non-quantal axioms. To speak of a wave-particle duality, says Landé, is to speak of an abstraction and a real thing as if they were on a level of parity; and he takes Born's statistical interpretation of quantum phenomena as evidence that a unitary particle theory is needed. The problem then is (...) to explain why particles obey quantum laws of interference and h-dominated periodicity. Although much of the book assumes knowledge of mathematics and physics, many sections require no scientific background; and in the more technical sections there are frequent summaries which state the arguments and conclusions in a non-mathematical way. An incisive and provocative work which deserves to be widely read.--B. J. H. (shrink)

Knowledge of eukaryotic life cycles and associated genome dynamics stems largely from research on animals, plants, and a small number of “model” (i.e., easily cultivable) lineages. This skewed sampling results in an underappreciation of the variability among the many microeukaryotic lineages, which represent the bulk of eukaryotic biodiversity. The range of complex nuclear transformations that exists within lineages of microbial eukaryotes challenges the textbook understanding of genome and nuclear cycles. Here, we look in‐depth at Foraminifera, an ancient (∼600 million‐year‐old) lineage (...) widely studied as proxies in paleoceanography and environmental biomonitoring. We demonstrate that Foraminifera challenge the “rules” of life cycles developed largely from studies of plants and animals. To this end, we synthesize data on foraminiferal life cycles, focusing on extensive endoreplication within individuals (i.e., single cells), the unusual nuclear process calledZerfall, and the separation of germline and somatic function into distinct nuclei (i.e., heterokaryosis). These processes highlight complexities within lineages and expand our understanding of the dynamics of eukaryotic genomes. (shrink)

This lucid and compact book contains a forceful critique of the "wave-particle duality" interpretations of quantum theory, and a unitary particle theory which explains the quantum rules in terms of non-quantal axioms. To speak of a wave-particle duality, says Landé, is to speak of an abstraction and a real thing as if they were on a level of parity; and he takes Born's statistical interpretation of quantum phenomena as evidence that a unitary particle theory is needed. The problem then is (...) to explain why particles obey quantum laws of interference and h-dominated periodicity. Although much of the book assumes knowledge of mathematics and physics, many sections require no scientific background; and in the more technical sections there are frequent summaries which state the arguments and conclusions in a non-mathematical way. An incisive and provocative work which deserves to be widely read.--B. J. H. (shrink)

As a celebration of theTractatus100th anniversary it might be worth revisiting its relation to the later writings. From the former to the latter, David Pears recalls that “everyone is aware of the holistic character of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, but it is not so well known that it was already beginning to establish itself in theTractatus” (The False Prison, 1987). From the latter to the former, Stephen Hilmy’s (The Later Wittgenstein, 1987) extensive study of theNachlasshas helped removing classical misconceptions such as (...) Hintikka’s claim that “Wittgenstein in thePhilosophical Investigationsalmost completely gave up the calculus analogy.” Hilmy points out that even in theInvestigationsone finds the use of the calculus/game paradigm to the understanding of language, such as “in operating with the word” (Part I, §559) and “it plays a different part in the calculus”. Hilmy also quotes from a late (1946) unpublished manuscript (MS 130) “this sentence has use in the calculus of language”, which seems to be compatible with “asking whether and how a proposition can be verified is only a particular way of asking ‘How do you mean?’” Central in this back and forth there is an aspect which seems to deserve attention in the discussion of a semantics for the language of mathematics which might be based on (normalisation of) proofs and/or Hintikka/Lorenzen game-dialogue: the explication of consequences. Such a discussion is substantially supported by the use of the open and searchableThe Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen. These findings are framed within the discussion of the meaning of logical constants in the context of natural deduction style rules of inference. (shrink)

The question of finding a suitable formal account of meaning for the logical signs has troubled many philosophers and logicians since the early days of formal logic, whenever it is even recognised as a problem. Here I attempt to show how two operational approaches to the problem can still be shown to be ‘technically’ equivalent, despite having emerged from two different readings of a single philosophical account, and being essentially distinct with respect to the rôle of ‘will’ in the mathematical (...) activity: on the one hand, the ‘semantics of use’, my own reformulation of P. Martin‐Löf's Intuitionistic Type Theory canonical‐values based semantics by taking the normalisation rules as the key semantical device; and, on the other hand, J. Hintikka's Game‐Theoretical Semantics, where the meaning of logical signs is given via semantical games. The philosophical account from which both emerge is precisely Wittgenstein's later account of propositions, where the notion of ‘language‐games’ is introduced as a key semantical device. Observing that the normalisation rules seem to be able to formalise the explanation of the consequences one can draw from a proposition,3 thus showing the function/purpose/usefulness of its main connective in the calculus of language, it seems reasonable to advocate that such a meta‐mathematical device can be a semantically useful notion which would lead to a more reasonable account of the problem of formulating the meaning of logical constants. (shrink)

SummaryPedigree structures of 161 uncle/niece-aunt/nephew and 4420 first cousin consanguineous marriages registered during the 19th and 20th centuries in two large and very different Spanish regions have been analysed and their genetic consequences evaluated. The frequencies of the different pedigree subtypes within each degree of relationship were quite similar in both populations despite significant heterogeneity in inbreeding patterns. The mean X-linked inbreeding coefficient for each type of cousin mating was calculated and compared to that expected for autosomal genes. The effect (...) of genealogical structure on theFx/Fradio was compared to different cultural populations worldwide. Preferentiality and avoidance of close consanguinity along with specific types of pedigrees are discussed on the basis of premarital migration and sociocultural rules still deeply rooted in certain human groups. By admitting that the observedFxcoefficient is usually higher thanFin most human populations some remarks have been made in terms of population genetic risk. (shrink)

This article reports the findings of a study into the role of Dutch nurses in the alleviation of pain and symptoms with a life-shortening intention, conducted as part of a study into the role of nurses in medical end-of-life decisions. A questionnaire survey was carried out using a population of 1509 nurses who were employed in hospitals, home care organizations and nursing homes. The response rate was 82.0%; 78.1% (1179) were suitable for analysis. The results show that in about half (...) of the cases (55.8%) nurses were involved in the decision making by the physician and that nurses were frequently (81.5%) involved in administering the medication. The authors' conclusion is that alleviation of pain and symptoms with a life-shortening intention represents a `grey' area, in which physicians and nurses act on the basis of personal ethical norms rather than legal rules, professional guidelines or shared moral values. (shrink)

Experimenters sometimes insist that it is unwise to examine data before determining how to analyze them, as it creates the potential for biased results. I explore the rationale behind this methodological guideline from the standpoint of an error statistical theory of evidence, and I discuss a method of evaluating evidence in some contexts when this predesignation rule has been violated. I illustrate the problem of potential bias, and the method by which it may be addressed, with an example from (...) the search for the top quark. A point in favor of the error statistical theory is its ability, demonstrated here, to explicate such methodological problems and suggest solutions, within the framework of an objective theory of evidence. (shrink)

A cross-cultural survey experiment revealed a dominant tendency to rely on a rule’s letter over its spirit when deciding which behaviors violate the rule. This tendency varied markedly across (k = 15) countries, owing to variation in the impact of moral appraisals on judgments of rule violation. Compared with laypeople, legal experts were more inclined to disregard their moral evaluations of the acts altogether and consequently exhibited stronger textualist tendencies. Finally, we evaluated a plausible mechanism for the (...) emergence of textualism: in a two-player coordination game, incentives to coordinate in the absence of communication reinforced participants’ adherence to rules’ literal meaning. Together, these studies (total n = 5,794) help clarify the origins and allure of textualism, especially in the law. Within heterogeneous communities in which members diverge in their moral appraisals involving a rule’s purpose, the rule’s literal meaning provides a clear focal point—an identifiable point of agreement enabling coordinated interpretation among citizens, lawmakers, and judges. (shrink)